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“Si vis pacem para bellum” 
(if you desire peace prepare for war)  
Roman saying 
 
 
It seems, therefore, that the Romans were right when they claimed that those who 
desire peace must prepare for war. This was, obviously, a strictly empirical finding 
attained centuries earlier before the world knew anything about defence economics, 
Richardson models, game theory or Nash equilibrium which are nowadays used simply 
to reach this very straightforward conclusion.  
The coincidence of theory and practice in this case leads to the following two very 
important considerations: The first one suggests that defence economics is by no means 
what some people refer to as “the painful elaboration of the obvious”. On the contrary, 
theoretical structures like the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph provide the 
means to firmly support the Roman views on the trade-off between war and peace. 
They, moreover, contribute to proving that those who lament over a wasted peace 
dividend do not know or, what is even worse, do not want to know the value of military 
security as an investment for peace
1
.  
The second one is much more specific, as it refers strictly to the way in which 
Turkey seems to convert theory into practice, being a devoted follower of the Roman 
views on the subject. This focus of the Turks to the Roman dogma is not unreasonable. 
                                                          
1
 There are numerous sources on the issue of the peace dividend, both theoretical and applied in the case 
of various countries. A useful source in this case would be the book by Gleditsch et al. (eds.) “The Peace 
Dividend”, North Holland, 1996 that includes studies for both Greece and Turkey.   
68                  A.S. Andreou and G.A. Zombanakis
    
 
In fact, it seems that Turkey feels threatened in more ways than one, as it has been 
involved in a number of crises, to a large or a lesser extent, especially during the past 
decade: The Gulf War during the beginning of the nineties and its current version in 
2003 have both underlined the threat of a Kurdish State, especially during a period in 
which the U.S. realizes that it can not count on Turkey for its long-term strategies, at 
least to the extent that it used to do before the JDP (Justice and Development Party) won 
the November 2002 elections. The instability in Georgia and Armenia in the north- east 
border and the tension occasionally prevailing between Turkey and Syria over territorial 
disputes can only contribute to this feeling of insecurity. Finally, the relations of Turkey 
with Greece offer a wide variety of occasions for friction between the two countries in a 
number of issues like the Turkish territorial ambitions in the broader Aegean Sea theatre 
and the Cyprus issue. It is only natural therefore, that Turkey should aim at interfering in 
all these cases in a manner that not only would appease its fears concerning its territorial 
status quo, but would also favor its strategic ambitions. To do so it has always been 
pursuing a very consistent defence procurement policy, even during financially rough 
times. This consistency has been repeatedly underlined by the long-term procurement 
programmes of the Turkish armed forces, to which the domestic defence industry 
contributes a substantial share
2
. And even in cases in which unforeseen difficulties 
might arise, like the major earthquake in 1999 and the recent economic and political 
crisis, the projects involved in these programmes are never cancelled. They are simply 
postponed for a number of years.  
As a result, Turkey has paid its focus on security matters rather dearly given the 
disappointing performance of its economy, especially during the recent past
3
. In fact, the 
                                                          
2
 The current long-term defence procurement programme of the Turkish armed forces has a 30-year time 
horizon. It expires in 2025 and involves purchases of the order of 150 billion U.S. dollars. For details on 
this issue the authorized reader may consult Pavlopoulos ( 2000 ).         
3
 Inflation rate in terms of consumer prices is of the order of 50% for the last few years while the Turkish 
lira market rate depreciates versus the U.S. dollar at rates ranging between 50% and 100%. The associated 
“persistently high real levels of interest rates”, states the latest OECD Economic Outlook, “are making the 
debt sustainability criterion difficult to meet, given the very large amount of short-term debt that either has 
to be rolled over, or has been issued on a floating-rate basis. The high proportion of the debt that is now 
denominated in or linked to foreign currencies also leaves the debt burden susceptible to exchange-rate 
changes”. The same OECD source points out in addition that “the currently high country risk premium 
will become an obstacle to growth. Another source of downside risk is bank lending to the corporate 
sector, as non-performing loans continue to rise and put pressure on banks’ capital. A significant 
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steady growth of its huge external debt has been sustained thanks to the scandalous 
generosity of the IMF, which grants Turkey one loan after another just upon request
4
. 
Yet, the SIPRI figures point out that the average growth rate of the country’s economy 
for the last thirty years or so, although not negligible, is lower than the corresponding 
defence expenditure figure
5
.  These choices of Ankara are even more impressive if one 
considers that they reflect the top importance, which it attaches to its defence 
procurement programmes in times during which almost all NATO allies reduce their 
defence budgets.   
The Greek views on this issue seem to be radically different. The time horizon of 
the procurement programmes, to which the domestic industry has been contributing a 
negligible percentage – at least before the privatization of the shipyard industry – does 
not usually exceed five years while they are always revised downwards on the grounds 
of hardly convincing excuses. In fact the most recent procurement programme of the 
Greek armed forces had been curtailed to reach about half its original budget, only two 
years after earning the approval of the parliament. The government claimed that it thus 
hoped to reallocate some of these funds to support its social policy and to finance some 
of the infrastructure projects of the 2004 Olympic games
6
. We feel that this is a rather 
weak argument considering the policy followed at least for about a decade now. In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
deterioration in the labor market, with adverse effects on income distribution, remains a major threat to 
consumption dynamics”.  
4
 The debt repayments due this year, which amount to 93 billion U.S. dollars, do not seem to be an 
impediment to the unobstructed flow of IMF loans to Turkey. The country, however, seems to have 
sacrificed the 6 billion dollar aid package, following its refusal to allow U.S. troops to use its territory in 
order to create a northern front during their recent invasion against Iraq.    
5
 The defence expenditure figures published in SIPRI do not include the generous contribution of the 
Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF).  
6
 On March 29, 2001 the government used these excuses not only to reduce the defence budget for the 
period 2002–2004 by one trillion drachmas, but in addition, to postpone the Greek participation to the 
construction of the fourth generation “Typhoon” fighter and the purchase of a number of these planes, 
thus weakening the long-run defence potential of Greece. The most important adverse repercussion of this 
decision is undoubtedly the fact that Greece missed the chance to participate in the European defence 
industry more actively than ever. The reader, however, will be very amused to know that exactly two years 
later, in March 2003, the Greek defence minister declared his priorities concerning mergers and other 
forms of integration of the European defence industry, as well as the increase of the research and 
development funds!           
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Kyriazis and Somakos
7
 point out that back in 1996 the government opted for spending 
1,350 billion drachmas in order to subsidize public enterprises, the managers of which 
seem to care more about employing the ruling party voters rather than pursuing strict 
business criteria. These subsidies, which were needed to finance the impact of the 
resulting diminishing returns and diseconomies of scale in these enterprises, exceeded 
the country’s annual defence expenditure by about 70%. Needless to point out that this 
money was enough to buy 193 F-16s or 96 F – 15s, much more than what the Hellenic 
Air Force would ever dream of purchasing! It seems that the dividing line between 
politics and demagogy is sometimes too thin for certain people to see. Except, if they 
pretend not to see …8 
We have strong reasons to believe that the second is more likely than the first. 
Those who preach the reduction of the Greek defence expenditure on the grounds that 
the economy has reached its capacity limits are engaged in first class sophistry, using 
arguments based on an apparent inverse relationship between defence expenditure and 
GDP rate of growth. We are sorry to point out, however, that a similar line of reasoning 
would support practically any form of correlation. Thus, for example, we have already 
mentioned the case of the Church subsidies in the north of Greece, which has resulted to 
an increase in the number of births in the area. We also know that following a set of 
environmental measures taken in the same area, the number of storks has increased 
spectacularly. The direct relationship, therefore, between the birth rate and the number 
of storks in the area indicates that storks bring babies!  
The scientific translation of this argument is the following: The GDP growth is not 
the only independent variable that influences the demand for defence expenditure and in 
                                                          
7
 Kyriazis and Somakos (1999) “Greece and Turkey, Defence and Economy’’ (in Greek) p.p. 32-33. 
 
8
 On November 14, 2001, the new Greek defence minister announced that the GDP percentage of the 
defence expenditure is targeted to have fallen down to 4% by 2004. These options of the Greek 
government in favor of a unilateral disarmament policy vis-à-vis Turkey are reflected in the SIPRI figures 
(in constant prices and exchange rates) which indicate that in terms of military equipment expenditure 
between 1999 and 2001, Greece shows a reduction by 1.7%, 2.9% and 13.7%, for each of these three 
consecutive years. During this period, which included both natural and financial earthquakes for Turkey, 
the corresponding Turkish figures denote increases by 36.4%, 7.4% and 22.8% respectively. As a result 
the ratio of the Greek equipment expenditure over the corresponding Turkish figure has witnessed a 
sustained decline throughout this period, from 0.664 in 1998 down to 0.304 in 2001.  
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most of the cases in the literature, the relationship between the two is a direct one
9
.  
There are, however, other independent variables used in the literature, like those 
representing the benefits of an alliance membership or the threat faced which sometimes 
count much more. Thus, the substantial reduction of the GDP share of defence 
expenditure to an average of about 4.5% for the nineties compared to almost 6.5% of the 
previous decade, did not lead to a rise of the GDP growth rates. In fact, the average GDP 
growth rate for the nineties witnessed a decline to 2.1% down from 2.4%, which was the 
corresponding figure in the eighties.  
But even in the case in which we accept that decision-makers in Greece do not see 
the logic of increased defence expenditure, we feel that they should, at least, consult the 
public opinion on the subject as it appears in the daily press. Indeed, they will be 
surprised to see the latest results of an opinion poll conducted on a quarterly basis 
throughout the country, which are quite impressive. Thus, according to the March 2003 
results of this poll, more than 70% of the Greeks interviewed feel that an increase of the 
funds devoted to defence spending is necessary in order to face external threats. We feel, 
therefore, that these results eliminate every argument in favor of curtailing defence 
expenditure in Greece, even that of vote maximizing! 
It is only straightforward, therefore, that, at least in the Greek case, the 
responsibility concerning the final decisions on defence expenditure, both quantitative 
and qualitative, lies on the politicians’ shoulders, with economists and soldiers just 
proposing solutions. Prior experience suggests that politicians are usually in favor of 
defence expenditure cuts for obvious reasons while most economists tend to agree on 
this, leaving soldiers to press for defence spending increases. The easy way out to settle 
this dichognomy would be to go along with the majority by agreeing on defence 
spending reduction. Before doing so, however, it is imperative to consult the public 
opinion, especially in our days when polls seem to affect almost every political decision. 
It is, thus, interesting to see that according to the latest (March 2003) results of an 
opinion poll conducted regularly throughout Greece on a quarterly basis more than 70% 
of the answers are in favor of increased defence spending given the external threat. We 
                                                          
9
 For a very useful review on the subject see Hartley, K. and Sandler, T. (1995) The Economics of 
Defence. U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
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believe that this admittedly striking result is enough to eliminate all arguments brought 
forward by the advocates of defence expenditure reduction and especially that of vote 
maximizing!    
In view of this considerable discrepancy of views we have thought that deciding on 
such a crucial matter demands resorting to our favorite line of argument, which makes 
extensive use of techniques of analysis. In fact, under the circumstances, the crucial 
question to answer concerns the so-called “optimal defence expenditure”, namely the 
desired level of defence spending compatible with the capacity of the economy. This 
compatibility is secured by the introduction of a constraints structure represented by a 
typical econometric model emphasizing on defence expenditure. Calculating the optimal 
defence expenditure, however, may cause considerable confusion with reference to the 
nature of the constraints imposed, something which has become more than obvious 
during conferences in which we have presented earlier versions of the paper that 
follows. We must point out beyond any doubt, therefore, that the term “optimal” is used 
in the text to define the maximum GDP share of defence expenditure allowed by the 
capacity of the country’s economy. It must, consequently, be interpreted as a strictly 
economic optimization which does not take any geopolitical or strategic matters into 
consideration, which is, admittedly, a very interesting task for further research. Given, 
however, that such matters should, and do, in fact, influence such decisions taking into 
account the increased volatility of the international geopolitical and strategic 
environment, the derived economic optimization results must be interpreted very 
carefully. More specifically, the optimal figures derived by our algorithm must be 
interpreted as representing defence expenditure figures that can be attained without any 
sacrifice in the form of a peace dividend, since they have been calculated under the 
constraints imposed by the economic system. Peace dividend considerations can be 
justified only to the extent that the defence spending figures exceed those suggested by 
our algorithm as financially optimal for reasons related to geopolitical and strategic 
considerations.  
As we have already pointed out, the contribution of techniques of analysis is 
decisive in the next chapter. In fact our algorithm performs an optimization under 
constraints that calculates the highest defence expenditure under the restrictions 
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imposed by the economic system. We have performed such a constrained optimization 
exercise for both Greece and Cyprus with the structure of the economies of the two 
allies provided by a system of equations placing particular emphasis on defence 
expenditure. The latter has been built along the lines of a typical defence demand 
equation, which however, includes as a special feature the relative security coefficient 
introduced in chapter 2. We are confident that the reader will acknowledge the vital role 
of such a technique in this case in which there is ample room for subjective evaluations 
concerning the ideal level of defence spending.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
Pavlopoulos J. (2000), “The Defence Procurement Programme of Turkey and its 
Repercussions on the Hellenic Navy”, Degree Thesis, Naval War College, Athens. 
      
74 
75 
 
 
 
 
Optimal Versus Required Defence Expenditure 
  The Case of the Greek – Turkish Arms Race
*
 
By 
Andreas S. Andreou, Konstantine E. Parsopoulos, Michael N. Vrahatis  
and George A. Zombanakis 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent rescheduling of the Turkish long-term defence procurement programmes 
following the economic crisis in the country and the reaction of the Greek authorities to 
reduce their own by about 25% has become the subject of extensive discussions. The 
issues involved in such discussions concern the possibility of a causal relationship 
between the developments in the two countries and the extent to which the two sides 
entangled, for ages now, in an expensive arms race, can afford a reduction of their 
defence expenditure. This leads to the next question, which involves the calculation of 
an “optimal” defence burden providing for maximum security in the face of an outside 
threat bounded by the constraints imposed by the economy.  
The optimization will take into account the spillover effects enjoyed by Greece and 
Cyprus, especially after the implementation of the Integrated Defence Doctrine between 
these two allies. Finally, we shall consider the extent to which pursuing such an 
optimum leads to a substantial peace dividend. The answers will be provided in the 
context of an optimal control solution, using an Interior Penalty Function Method, with 
                                                          
*
 First published in “Defence and Peace Economics”, vol. 13, 4, 2002, pp. 329-347. 
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Steepest Descent and Armijo Line Search, after a brief literature overview has been 
provided in section 2. The third part of this paper includes the description of the 
econometric model used by the algorithm as a constraints structure under which the 
penalty function is minimized. Section 4 includes various policy considerations based 
on the results derived by the algorithm, while the conclusions derived are stated in the 
last part of the paper.  
 
 
3.2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
The existence of an arms race between Greece and Turkey is a well-established fact 
(Kollias and Makrydakis 1997), determined, to a large extent, by demographic factors 
describing the Turkish rather than the Greek economic and demographic environment 
(Andreou and Zombanakis 2000). The extent to which mutual reduction of defence 
expenditure would lead to a substantial peace dividend has been extensively analyzed 
for both the Greek-Turkish case (Balfoussias and Stavrinos 1996, Ozmucur 1996, 
Kollias 1997), as well in a more general context referring to the cost in terms of growth 
(Deger 1986, Ward et al. 1991, Buck et. al.1993, Looney 1994 and several authors in 
Hartley and Sandler 1990). In fact, the cost of an arms race, especially on the foreign 
sector of what is commonly termed a “small, open economy” is rather expensive since 
military expenditure, is highly import-demanding, leading to foreign borrowing which 
exerts an adverse impact on both the domestic and the foreign sector (Stavrinos and 
Zombanakis 1998). Especially after the full implementation of the Integrated Defence 
Doctrine between Greece and Cyprus, the GDP shares of military expenditure by the 
two allies have exceeded 6% in certain cases, while the military debtin current U.S. 
dollars has doubled during the 1990s to reach more than 5 billion at the end of 2000, 
representing   about 16% of the total General Government external debt of the country, 
according to provisional Bank of Greece data.  Kollias (1994, 1995 and 1996) and 
Antonakis (1996 and 1997) have investigated the economic effects of defence 
expenditure upon the Greek economy. 
Defence expenditure constitutes a considerable burden for the economies of Greece 
and Cyprus, raising questions about the ideal defence burden. A convenient way to 
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tackle such issues is using a constrained optimization analysis, which requires 
minimizing the deviations of the endogenous variables of an economic system from 
their respective target values subject to the constraints imposed by the economy (e.g. 
Chow 1975, Levy 1992). The method thus leads to determining the ideal or optimal 
values for those variables, to the extent, of course, that these are attainable. It is 
important to stress that the derived values for defence expenditure shall be characterized 
as optimal in the strict economics sense without involving any constraints of strategic or 
tactical nature, an issue beyond the scope of this paper. The optimal control analysis, 
therefore, will specify the defence expenditure that the two allies are able to afford in 
the context of the theory of alliances in its simplest form (Hartley and Sandler 1995).  
 
 
3.3 THE MODEL 
The constraint structure we use for the optimization procedure is a small, highly 
aggregated model of seven equations representing the economies of Greece and Cyprus. 
The model is based on previous research (Stavrinos and Zombanakis 1998), placing 
emphasis on the defence expenditure side, while variables expressing the Turkish side 
are taken as exogenous. The majority of the variables are expressed in terms of GDP 
percentages aiming at concentrating on the growth effects of the priorities assigned to 
defence policy. Such effects became more pronounced in cases like the Turkish invasion 
of Cyprus in 1974 and the Greek-Turkish crises in 1982 and 1987. As a first step, all the 
variables in the stochastic equations have been expressed in natural logs and tested for 
integration. The data series used are listed in Table 1. 
 
3.3.1 The Demand for Defence Expenditure and the Security Function. 
The demand for defence expenditure for each of the two allies, namely Greece and 
Cyprus, is represented as follows:  
          GDEFCRS = f (GGDPCS, GNDEFCRS, GBOP, DRDL, RSCG, TDEFCRS)    (1) 
          CDEFCRS = f (CGDPCS, CNDEFCRS, CBOP, DLCP, RSCG, TDEFCRS)      (2) 
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where GDEFCRS and CDEFCRS are the corresponding GDP shares of defence 
expenditure for the two allies. 
 
 
Table 1: Variables and data sources 
Code Data Series Source 
GGDPCS GDP of Greece, Constant Prices Greek National Accounts 
CGDPCS GDP of Cyprus, Constant Prices Cypriot National Accounts 
GTIS 
Greek Government Total Investment 
Expenditure (share of GDP) 
Greek National Accounts 
GDEFCRS 
Defence Expenditure of Greece (share 
of GDP) 
SIPRI 
CDEFCRS 
Defence Expenditure of Cyprus (share 
of GDP) 
SIPRI 
TDEFCRS 
Defence Expenditure of Turkey (share 
of GDP) 
SIPRI 
GNDEFCRS 
Non-Defence Government Expenditure 
of Greece (share of GDP) 
Greek National Accounts 
CNDEFCRS 
Non-Defence Government Expenditure 
of Cyprus (share of GDP) 
Cypriot National Accounts 
GBOP 
Greek Balance – of – Payments Deficit 
(share of GDP) 
Greek National Accounts 
CBOP 
Cypriot Balance – of – Payments Deficit 
(share of GDP) 
Cypriot National Accounts 
DRDL Drachma / U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Bank of Greece 
DLCP 
U.S. Dollar / Cypriot Pound Exchange 
Rate 
I.F.S. 
GCPI Greek Consumer Price Index I.F.S. 
CCPI Cypriot Consumer Price Index I.F.S. 
GPOP Greek Population Growth I.F.S. 
CPOP Cypriot Population Growth I.F.S. 
 
 
 
Military expenditure is usually reported in current prices in local currency terms. 
For most purposes of economic analysis, however, it is the share of military expenditure 
to GDP - the military burden - that is of most interest because it reflects the relative 
priority given by the state to military demands and because it measures the relative 
 Optimal vs. Required Defence Expenditure               79 
 
 
burden or resource costs
10
. Its calculation does not depend on the choice of a specific 
price index, since it is the ratio of two measures in current domestic currency. It is a 
pure number that can be compared over time and across countries and it is by now 
extensively used in empirical investigations. There is, however, caution expressed in the 
literature since measuring the military spending and the other variables in the model as 
shares or proportions of GDP can be misleading and may introduce biases in the 
measurement of certain coefficients (Chan 1985). Assuming inflation rates roughly 
equal for defence and non-defence activities, omitting the price variable does not 
introduce any biasing results
11
. GGDPCS and CGDPCS is the Greek and Cypriot GDP 
at constant prices respectively, GNDEFCRS and CNDEFCRS represent the share of 
non-defence expenditure in the GDP of the two countries, GBOP and CBOP represent 
the Greek and Cypriot balance-of-payments deficits as a share in their respective GDP, 
while DRDL and DLCP stand for the two countries respective currency rates against the 
US dollar. Notice that the price variable is not included in these functions, due to the 
lack of import substitution in the two countries, a problem which renders the demand for 
defence equipment almost completely price inelastic. The threat variable in both cases is 
TDEFCRS, which represents the share of defence expenditure in the Turkish GDP. 
Finally, special attention should be drawn to the spillover variable: One might be 
tempted to argue that a suitable spillover variable would be the military burden of the 
NATO countries except Greece and Turkey. We feel, however, that since our aim is to 
concentrate on the Greek-Cypriot alliance as this is expressed through the Integrated 
Defence Doctrine, what is required is an alternative measure tailored to fit this particular 
case. We have chosen, therefore to use a measure of relative security as a result of the 
two countries’ alliance. This is applicable to cases in which the role of the substantial 
difference in human resources endowments between the two sides involved in an arms 
                                                          
10
 See Goertz and Diehl (1986), and Herrera (1994), for the comparison of different approaches in 
measuring military allocations. 
11
 See Hartley and Sandler (1995) p.61. Data on prices of Greek and Cypriot defence equipment – usually 
importables – is not available. To the extent that such imports are reported in the balance of payments, 
import prices of the appropriate SITC category do not exhibit significant differences compared to the rest 
of the categories. 
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race is decisive (Andreou and Zombanakis 2001). The measure of this relative security 
coefficient is given by
12
:  
     RSCG = exp[x]                                          (3) 
where x stands for the ratio of the difference between the Greek and Cypriot population 
rates of change over the corresponding Turkish figure, as follows:  
where         TCG p/p-px                     (4) 
On the basis of (3) and (4) one may be tempted to argue that the ideal alliance target 
for a balance between the two sides concerning security would be a value of RSCG = 
2.718, once x assumes the value of unity. Under the circumstances, however, this is a 
prohibitive restriction, meaning that the applied side of the matter calls for a more 
realistic constraint. It must be borne in mind, however, that this relative security 
coefficient composed of the population characteristics of the two sides involved in an 
arms race includes more than meets the eye: In fact, the role of the population rates of 
increase in the RSCG is not only associated with the possibilities to increase manpower 
in the armed forces, something which does not necessarily agree with the recipes of 
modern warfare tactics. It is also linked with the continuous and pressing demands of 
Turkey for increase of its vital space justified by the population explosion in the 
country. We feel, therefore, that, given the particularity of the Greek-Turkish arms race, 
which is affected to a large extent by population developments in the countries involved, 
the RSCG identity can serve as a security function entering the allies’ utility function
13
.  
 
3.3.2 The Output Equation. 
The GDP in the two countries is determined on the basis of a behavioral equation 
rather than an identity, given that the optimization procedure requires that emphasis is 
                                                          
12
 The RSCG is a relative security measure particularly tailored to fit cases like the Greece / Cyprus 
conflict against Turkey. In cases like this the population rates of increase in the two sides play a leading 
role and this index is designed to emphasize on this specific point, as it is explained in the text. The target 
set for the RSCG in this optimization procedure is that population developments on the Greek / Cypriot 
alliance side counterbalance the Turkish generous population rates of increase, a rather demanding target 
one must admit. If this is the case, then the numerator must equal the denominator of x yielding a value of 
unity, the log of which is 2.718. For a detailed explanation on this relative security measure see Andreou 
and Zombanakis 2001. 
13
 See, for example, Bruce (1990). 
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placed on the shares of the various GDP components in it. Equations (5) and (6) 
describe growth in the two allied countries in terms of its main ingredients: 
accumulation of physical capital as investment in Greece and Cyprus, GTI and CTI 
respectively, non-defence expenditure, net imports of goods and services as an 
indication of the external constraint imposed on the growth rate of the economy. Finally, 
the local currency exchange rate is included given that it has been a very popular policy 
instrument for the period under study. Thus the GDP in both countries is taken as 
determined as follows: 
GGDPCS = f (GNDEFCRS, GTI, GBOP, DRDL)                   (5) 
CGDPCS = f (CNDEFCRS, CTI, GBOP, DLCP)        (6) 
where GTI and CTI stand for the GDP shares of total investment expenditure in 
Greece and Cyprus. It must be borne in mind that given the trade-off between non-
defence and defence expenditure (Benoit 1978), the latter can be thought of as implicitly 
introduced in these functions to account for the direct effects of military spending on 
growth in the form of spin-offs, either favorable or adverse (Hartley and Sandler 
1995)
14
. Thus, equations (9) and (12) presented in Table 2 simply underline the 
importance of the various output components in the GDP of each country, as well as the 
leading role of the international exchange rate, a policy instrument traditionally used by 
the economies of the two allies.   
 
3.3.3 The Population Equation 
Since we have already underlined the importance of human resources in the Greek - 
Turkish conflict (Andreou and Zombanakis 2000 and 2001), we have chosen to devote a 
behavioral equation to describe population developments in each of the two allies
15
. 
Thus, the Greek and Cypriot populations are taken to behave as follows: 
GPOP = f ( GGDPCS, GDEFCRS, GNDEFCRS, GCPI )                      (7) 
CPOP = f ( CGDPCS, CDEFCRS, CNDEFCRS, CCPI )            (8) 
                                                          
14
 General surveys of the effects of military expenditure on growth and development are given in Renner 
(1991), Isard and Anderton (1992), Pivetti (1992), Mintz and Stevenson (1995), and Ward et al. (1995), 
among others. For comprehensive bibliographies in English see Klein et al (1995), and Hartley and 
Hooper (1990). 
15
 For a very useful review on the subject we resorted to Ehrlich and Lui (1997). 
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where GCPI and CCPI are the Greek and Cypriot consumer price indices. The 
estimated equations (11) and (14) for the two allies described in Table 3 draw attention 
to the role of both non-defence expenditure and the consumer price index in determining 
population growth (Ehrlich and Lui 1997). The consumer price index is included in the 
function in order to introduce the budget constraint imposed on low - income families 
that cannot afford to contribute to the population growth.  
 
 
Table 2. Model equations for Greece (t-values) 
 EQ.9  (GGDPCS) EQ.10  (GDEFCRS) EQ.11  (GPOP) 
C 0.022   (3.281) -0.029   (-2.553) 0.001   (1.371) 
GNDEFCRS  -4.872   (-17.598) 0.012   (1.837) 
GNDEFCRS(-1) 0.100   (1.931)   
GTIS 0.235   (6.350)   
GBOP(-1)  -0.295   (-4.859)  
GBOP(-4) -0.056   (-1.878)   
DRDL -0,062   (-1.635) 0.547   (8.289)  
GGDPCS   0.026   (2.286) 
GGDPCS(-1) 0.476   (4.869)   
GGDPCS(-2)  0.354   (2.102)  
GCPI(-2)   -0.0003   (-4.927) 
RSCG (-1)  -0.010   (-2.327)  
GDEFCRS(-3)   -0.005   (-2.001) 
GPOP(-1)   0.635   (6.606) 
TDEFCRS  0.112   (2.197)  
RES(-1) -0.048   (-1.984) -0.147   (-1.904) -0.113   (-3.054) 
DGGDP -0.047   (-5.416)   
DDIC 0.048   (5.994)   
DGDEF  0.086   (9.881)  
DGDEMO   0.006   (5.547) 
 
 
3.3.4 Comments on the Equation Estimates 
Equations (9) to (14) as listed in Tables 2 and 3, and the relative security measure 
for the two allies given by the combination of (3) and (4) make up the constraint 
structure under which the optimization exercise will be undertaken.  
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Table 3. Model equations for Cyprus (t-values) 
 EQ.12   (CGDPCS) EQ.13   (CDEFCRS) EQ.14   (CPOP) 
C 0.052   (9.331) 0.024   (1.521) -0.004   (-0.614) 
CNDEFCRS 0.227   (2.953) -16.595   (-26.348)  
CNDEFCRS(-4)   0.055   (1.889) 
CBOP -0.515   (-6.520)   
CBOP(-1)  -0.367   (-2.037)  
DLCP 0.250   (3.189) -0.455   (-2.578)  
CGDPCS    
CGDPCS(-2)   0.065   (1.823) 
CGDPCS(-3) 0.372   (2.197)   
CCPI   -0.016   (-4.026) 
RSCG (-2)   -0.014   (-1.538) 
CDEFCRS(-3)    
CPOP(-1)    
TDEFCRS  0.418   (3.320)  
RES(-1) -0.164   (-7.383) -0.704   (-5.442) -0.382  ( -8.645) 
DCGDP 0.130   (10.071)   
DCINV   0.031   (5.275) 
DCDEF  0.210   (8.222)  
DCDEMO   -0.118   (-10.175) 
TIME   0.004   (8.886) 
 
 
 
All series have been found to be I(1), that is, stationary in their first differences, on 
the basis of the ADF test, while the estimation period undertaken ranges between 1960 
and 2000. The short-run estimates presented in Table 4 comprise an error-correction 
model, with all coefficients bearing the expected signs and accompanied by their t 
values in parentheses, while the explanatory power of all six equations is satisfactory.  
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Table 4: Equation diagnostics and A.D.F. values for the residuals of their long-run versions 
CODE NAME R
2
 D.W. S.E. A.D.F.
*
 J-B ARCH F(Pr) 
EQ.9 
(GGDPCS) 
0.88 2.39 0.016 -2.84 0.77 0.09 (0.76) 
EQ.10 
(GDEFCRS) 
0.98 1.87 0.025 -2.59 0.66 0.27 (0.60) 
EQ.11 (GPOP) 0.81 1.86 0.002 -3.33 1.54 0.64 (0.42) 
EQ.12 
(CGDPCS) 
0.84 2.02 0.033 -2.76 1.70 0.32 (0.57) 
EQ.13 
(CDEFCRS) 
0.97 1.60 0.060 -3.98 0.04 0.87 (0.35) 
EQ.14 (CPOP) 0.91 1.41 0.012 -2.06 1.17 0.30 (0.58) 
*
All A.D.F. tests indicate that the series are I(0) at a 1% level except equation 14 which 
describes the behaviour of the Cypriot population in the case of which is I(0) at  a 5% level.   
The J-B (Jarque-Bera statistic) shows that the errors are normally distributed while the ARCH 
figures for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity are not significant. 
 
 
Finally, given the length of the estimation period, the dummies used in the 
equations tackle the effects of crises between Greece and Turkey or the influence of 
exogenous disturbances of political or social nature that introduce structural changes in 
the economies of the two allies
16
. Thus, DCDEMO is used to capture the dramatic 
change in the Cypriot population after the 1974 invasion while DGDEMO includes the 
exogenous disturbance of the Greek population after the massive inflow of refugees 
from Turkey during the mid-sixties and the substantial increase in the number of illegal 
immigrant workers mainly from Albania and Bulgaria during the beginning of the 
nineties. DGDEF and DCDEF are used to capture revisions in the long-run defence 
programmes of Greece and Cyprus or lump sum purchases, which are settled through 
bilateral agreements and are not reflected in the external accounts of the two countries. 
The procurement of the Type-209 submarines from HDW by the Greek Navy during the 
beginning of the seventies, the so-called purchase of the century involving the 
procurement of a large number of Mirage fighters during the mid-eighties, its revision 
after the change of the Greek government at the beginning of the nineties and the 
procurement of the S-300 antiaircraft missiles by Cyprus during the end of the nineties 
                                                          
16
 See Hartley and Sandler (1995) p.61. 
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are typical examples. DGGDP and DCGDP represent the effects of certain exogenous 
disturbances on the economies of the two allies like the three devaluations of the 
drachma in 1983, 1985 and 1996 and the pressure upon the Cypriot economy after the 
1974 shock. Finally, DDIC and DCINV capture the prolonged social and political 
instability in Greece and Cyprus caused by the dictatorial regime between 1967 and 
1974.  
All variables are expressed in terms of first differences with the RES terms 
indicating the residual item of the corresponding long-run version of each equation. The 
A.D.F. tests for these terms along with selected diagnostics are also included in Table 4. 
 
3.3.4.1 The Demand for Defence Expenditure 
The resulting estimated equations for Greece (eq. 10) and Cyprus (eq. 13) listed in 
Tables 5 and 6 describe the picture of their alliance against Turkey along the lines 
indicated in the literature. The trade-off between defence and non-defence expenditure 
is underlined in the cases of both Greece and Cyprus while the spill and threat variables 
seem to be important determinants of their defence expenditure. Finally, the long time 
lag required for the income variable to affect military spending is expected given the 
long-term horizon of the various defence procurement programmes that represent a 
considerable part of military spending in the two allied countries. The income 
inelasticity of defence expenditure in both equations underlines one of the major issues 
that this paper points out, namely the necessity to adhere to the defence-expenditure 
programmes undertaken. The negative sign of the balance-of-payments coefficient in 
both cases designates the external constraint imposed on the defence-procurement 
programmes, a constraint reinforced by the exchange-rate effect, the coefficient in all 
cases indicating an inelastic response of the defence expenditure to these variables. 
Attention is required when interpreting the difference in the sign of the exchange - rate 
coefficient between the Greek and the Cypriot cases that is due to the inversion of the 
parity fraction in the case of Cyprus.       
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3.3.4.2 The Output Equation 
Equations (9) and (12) represent the Greek and Cypriot output growth respectively 
in terms of their main components and the domestic currency exchange rate against the 
U.S. All estimates bear the expected sign and are statistically significant with a marginal 
exception in the case of the exchange rate in (9). This point, together with the low 
elasticity derived in both equations are related to the controversy associated with the 
effects of a domestic currency devaluation on the rate of growth (Zombanakis 1998) 
while attention, once more, is drawn to the difference in the sign of the exchange - rate 
coefficient between (9) and (12). The considerable time-lag in the case of the external 
constraint in the Greek case is related to the lengthy time period involved between an 
external trade transaction and its settlement with the conversion of the foreign exchange 
proceeds or payments to domestic currency, given that foreign exchange restrictions 
apply for a major part of the estimation period.        
 
3.3.4.3 The Population Equation 
The estimation of the two population equations (11) and (14) has faced a number of 
difficulties mainly due to the poor data quality, especially in the case of Cyprus, in 
which the 1974 invasion has introduced a major disturbance in the population pattern of 
growth. All coefficients, however, are statistically significant and bear the expected 
sign. The constraint imposed on population growth due to the standard of living is 
approximated by the consumer price index the reaction to which turns out to be quite 
significant, however highly inelastic in both cases. Finally, devoting funds to non-
defence activities seems to contribute to the population increase while this is not the 
case for defence expenditure, at least in the case of the equation for Greece. Introducing 
defence spending in the Cypriot version of the equation did not produce any meaningful 
results and was, consequently excluded. 
 
3.3.4.4 The Constrained Optimization    
The description of the historical data on the basis of the model seems to be quite 
satisfactory following a dynamic simulation. Given this set of equations as a constraint 
structure, the optimization problem is formulated by requiring the minimization of a 
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“welfare function” the arguments of which are the squared deviations of the endogenous 
variables from their respective targets. These targets are set in the context of a number 
of scenarios while the policy instruments used are the GDP shares of defence 
expenditure in the two allied countries. Given that the importance assigned to each of 
these endogenous variables may differ depending on each policy-maker’s hierarchy 
ordering and priorities, we have decided to perform the constrained optimization 
introducing these priorities in the welfare function in two different ways: The first is to 
assign equal weights to all endogenous variables introducing a cardinal hierarchy 
ordering in terms of determining a target value for each endogenous variable which 
reflects the emphasis placed on either property or human resources. The second is to 
allow this emphasis to be reflected in the weights rather than the target values of the 
endogenous variables, an approach which focuses on the ordinal aspect of the hierarchy 
ordering. While the equations above have been estimated for the period between 1960 
and 2000, the optimization exercise concentrates on the last eleven years, namely 1990 
to 2000, in order to avoid the adverse repercussions of a large number of structural 
reforms, mostly of political nature, affecting Greece and Cyprus during the previous 
three decades.  
 The technique we employ for solving the Optimal Control problem is an Interior 
Penalty Function Method, with Steepest Descent and Armijo Line Search. This has been 
used for the minimization phase as follows: 



m
j j
kk
xg
rxfrx
1 )(
1
)(),( ,                  (15) 
where f(x) is the sum of squared differences between the variables and their 
corresponding target values (i.e. the original objective function), gj(x), j=1,...,m, are the 
constraints of the proposed model, and rk is the penalty parameter. The repeated 
application of an unconstrained minimization technique to the function Φ(x), for a 
decremented sequence of values of the penalty parameter rk, leads to convergence of the 
corresponding solutions to the solution of the original (constrained) problem, with 
feasibility standing for each one of the intermediate solutions. 
For the unconstrained minimization phase of the algorithm, we employ a widely 
used method, namely the Steepest Descent technique with Armijo Line Search, allowing 
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the solution an accuracy of 10
-3
, while the maximum number of iterations was set to 500 
for all the loops of the algorithm. This maximum number of iterations proved to be 
enough for obtaining the solution in almost all experiments. In certain cases, however, 
in which the solution could not be detected after these iterations, re-initialization to a 
different feasible staring point was considered as an alternative. The validity of the 
results obtained has been double-checked using a modification of the Particle Swarm 
Optimization (PSO) method for locating all the global minima of an objective function 
(Parsopoulos and Vrahatis 2001). This involves setting a threshold, beyond which 
particles of the population bearing lower function values are isolated. Following that, 
stretching (Parsopoulos et al. 2001) or deflation is performed at this point in order to 
repel the rest of the swarm (population) from moving toward it. Finally, a local search is 
performed in its neighborhood, thus detecting a local minimum. Applied to the function 
Φ(x), the modified PSO resulted in several local minima of the objective function as 
well as the global one which, has been compared to the one obtained by the Steepest 
Descent algorithm. The main aspects of this algorithm are shown in the pseudo-code 
listings of the following two subsections. 
 
3.3.4.4.1 Pseudo-Code 1: Interior Penalty Function Method With Steepest Descent 
and Armijo Line Search 
Step 1 
Set initial values:  
r0 = 10  (Penalty term’s initial value)  
stop_crit1, stop_crit2 = 0  (stopping criteria) 
iter1, iter2  = 0  (iteration counters) 
MaxIt = 500  (maximum iterations)  
x0  (initial feasible, randomly taken, approximation of the solution) 
xlast = x0  (auxiliary parameter) 
xold = x0  (auxiliary parameter) 
r = r0  (penalty term variable) 
acc = 10
-3
  (desired accuracy) 
h0 = 1  (Initial step for the minimization phase) 
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Step 2 
WHILE  (stop_crit1 = 0)  AND  (iter1 < MaxIt)  DO 
Step 2.1 
Set  iter1 = iter1+1, iter2 = 0. 
Step 2.2 
(* Starting Gradient Descent phase of the algorithm *) 
WHILE  (stop_crit2 = 0)  AND  (iter2 < MaxIt)  DO 
Step 2.2.1 
Set h = h0 , iter2 = iter2 +1 and xnew = xold – h Φ(xold, r). 
Step 2.2.2 
(* Perform Armijo Line Search to find the optimal step size *) 
WHILE  ( Φ(xnew, r) - Φ(xold, r) > -0.5 h ||Φ(xold, r)||
2
  )  DO 
Set  h = 0.5 h. 
Re-calculate  xnew = xold – h Φ(xold, r). 
END WHILE  (* End of Armijo Line Search *) 
Step 2.2.3 
IF  ||Φ(xnew, r)|| ≤ acc  THEN  
stop_crit2 = 1  
ELSE  
xold = xnew  
END IF 
END WHILE  (* End of  Gradient Descent phase *) 
Step 2.3 
IF  ||xnew – xlast|| ≤ acc  THEN  
stop_crit1 = 1  
ELSE  
r = 0.1 r 
xlast = xnew 
xold = xnew 
stop_crit2 = 0 
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END IF 
END WHILE 
Step 3 
Print the final solution xnew and the rest statistics (total iterations, Armijo iterations etc.). 
 
3.3.4.4.2 Pseudo-Code 2: Particle Swarm Optimization Method 
Step 1 
Set a threshold ε > 0 and a number of desired minima, N. 
Step 2 
Initialize randomly the population, velocities and the parameters of PSO. Set the set of 
found  minima, L = .  
Step 3 
Set the maximum number of iterations, MaxIt, and the counter iter = 0. 
Step 4 
WHILE card(L)  N  AND  iter < MaxIt  DO 
Step 4.1 
Set  iter = iter +1 and update PSO’s inertia weight. 
Step 4.2 
Find the best particle, xbest, of the swarm and check its value Φ(xbest). 
Step 4.3 
    IF  Φ(xbest) ≤ ε  THEN  
Isolate xbest and perform local search around it and add the corresponding 
solution to L.  
Add a new particle, randomly chosen, into the swarm. 
Apply Deflation at xbest by substituting the function Φ(x) with  
||||
)(
bestxx
x


 or apply Stretching by substituting Φ(x) with 
 
  )()(tanh
1)()(sign
2
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
 and  γ1 = 10000,  
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γ2 = 1, μ = 10
-10
. 
    END IF 
END WHILE   
Step 5 
Print all elements of L and other desired parameters. 
Thus, the solutions were verified and then used for conclusions extraction. 
 
3.3.4.4.3 Fixed versus variable weighting scheme   
Multiplying a term of the quadratic penalty function with a weight w>1, steepens 
the function at the direction of the corresponding variables, without, however, changing 
the nonlinear constraints implied by the model. This may result in optimal values that lie 
closer to the target values, for these variables. The same effect may be achieved, if the 
target values are properly increased.  
Let xi be the variable under consideration. Then, the first partial derivative of the 
penalty function Φ(x, rk) in xi is defined as 

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  is the sum of the squared differences of the variables and 
their corresponding target values. Thus, after the multiplication with w,  
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If, instead of multiplying by w, an offset a is added to the target value of xi, then  
  atx
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        (18) 
These two forms of the first partial derivative of f, are equal if  
1

w
a
tx ii          (19) 
If the above relation does not hold, then the effect may be different in each case, 
depending on the constraints. This explains the variation in the optimal values, 
depending on the weight w and the offset a used in each case.  
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3.4 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
The analysis that follows is based on prior work on the conflict between Greece and 
Turkey, pointing out the importance of human resources in the arms race between the 
two sides (Andreou and Zombanakis 2000). This means that there are three possible 
strategies that may be followed concerning the emphasis placed on resources. Two 
strategies emphasise human or property resources alone and a third one, using both 
property and human resources simultaneously. Emphasis on human resources is 
described by setting the Greek population rate to increase by about 1.5% to 2%, and the 
corresponding Cypriot figure to remain close to zero. This difference in the population 
growth rates of the two allies will thus be equal to the Turkish population growth rate, 
keeping the two conflicting sides in a balance according to the relative security criterion 
RSCG, a very ambitious target indeed! Emphasis on property resources, capital 
equipment in particular, is expressed by setting the GDP growth rates of the two allies to 
5%. All three strategies must then be compared to a neutral, “reference” strategy in the 
sense that it does not stress the importance of either property or human resources. Each 
of these strategies, in its turn, involves four possible scenarios as it is usually the case in 
a typical arms race examined via game theory, or in the context of the “prisoner’s 
dilemma” (Majeski 1984). We assign, therefore, increasing or decreasing future values 
to the GDP shares of defence expenditure of Greece and Cyprus on one hand and 
Turkey on another
17
, thus referring to the following four scenarios, with the terms 
“reduction” and “escalation” suggesting a respective decrease or increase of the GDP 
share of defence expenditure of the country or countries involved: 1 - Both sides 
escalate, 2 - Greece and Cyprus escalate and Turkey reduces, 3 - Turkey escalates and 
Greece and Cyprus reduce and 4 - Both sides reduce
18
. 
 
                                                          
17
 The choice of the defence expenditure as a share of the GDP rather than the level of the military 
expenditure itself is widely used in the literature and aims at introducing, to a certain extent at least, the 
question of sustainability of the defence burden by relating it to the total output of an economy. 
18
 The one-sided reduction of defence expenditure by either side hardly reflects an arms race environment 
and is simply included to adopt the picture to the theoretical framework of a simple arms race 
environment (e.g. Hartley and Sandler 1995). 
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3.4.1 Arms Race: Both Sides Escalate (Scenario 1) 
In case that both conflicting sides, i.e. Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey 
on another, pursue escalation tactics the average optimal Greek and Cypriot GDP share 
of defence expenditure stands at about 3.5% for the decade under consideration. This is 
a very reasonable figure to a large extent, although slightly higher, compared to the 
corresponding figures of most EU and NATO members. The fact remains, however, that 
this figure for the two allies reaches as high as 6.0% to 6.5% in certain cases, depending 
on the time profile of their armament programmes. It is interesting to point out, 
however, that the optimal defence expenditure figure, as a percentage of GDP, is 
remarkably stable on the average at about 3.4% to 3.6% for both allies, irrespective of 
strategies chosen. However, the average alliance relative security, as this is measured by 
RSCG, for the period under consideration obtains its highest optimal value when 
preponderance of human resources alone is assumed. This means that maximising the 
GDP share of defence expenditure alone, by itself, is not the only recipe for security 
maximisation, especially in the case of the Greek-Turkish arms race, in which the role 
of human resources is leading.   
The deviations of the optimal values derived by the algorithm from their respective 
actual observations are a further interesting point to observe. It is important to stress at 
this point that the values derived are “optimal” only from the economics point of view 
that is compatible to the constraints imposed by the model. Such values, therefore, are 
expected to differ compared to the corresponding actual values which can be considered 
as “de facto optimal” since their choice involves, in addition, geopolitical and strategic 
criteria that do not enter our constraints structure. Thus, the difference between the two 
aims at pointing out the resources devoted to defence over and above what the 
constrained optimisation procedure indicates and may be regarded as the cost suffered as 
a result of the arms race in which Greece and Cyprus are involved against Turkey. The 
first point to make concerns the main issue, which is the GDP shares of defence 
expenditure for the two allies. It seems that the Greek economy exceeds the optimal 
defence burden by about 25% on the average irrespective of the strategy followed. The 
excess defence expenditure with respect to the suggested optimal in the Greek case 
reaches close to 30% on the average for the period under review, when emphasis is 
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placed on property resources. This is to a large extent, expected since it reflects the high 
cost of transforming the defence mechanism from a manpower-intensive complex to a 
defence mechanism focusing on small-numbered efficient forces armed with very 
expensive modern equipment, given the constraint imposed by the Greek economy. On 
the contrary, average defence overspending is slightly higher than 10% in the case of 
Cyprus, for all strategies involved, indicating that the Cypriot GDP share of defence 
spending is close to its optimal level. The extent to which this is a policy option or, 
instead, a result of a supply constraint remains to be seen as a matter of further research. 
It is important to concentrate, finally, on the security level as this is measured by RSCG 
and attained by employing various strategies, in the context of the arms race scenario: 
To begin with, it seems that in all cases and as a result of defence overspending, the 
average actual security performance considerably exceeds the optimal. This finding also 
suggests that in the context of the ongoing arms race, the optimal security level required 
for the alliance leaves a great deal to be desired if emphasis were placed on property, 
rather than human resources. In fact, given the heavy structural reform cost of 
transforming the forces of the alliance into efficient, small-scale, well-equipped units on 
one hand, and the constraint of the alliance economies on the other, the average optimal 
security performance of the alliance deviates from the corresponding actual figure 
considerably. This deviation may be considerably restricted if the strategy concentrates 
on human resources, which, however, happens to be the strong point of the Turkish side 
(Andreou and Zombanakis 2001). Bearing, therefore, these considerations in mind, we 
feel that property resources must be awarded special attention despite the cost involved, 
simply because Greece and Cyprus are expected to suffer a considerable disadvantage in 
the field of human resources in the long run. This view seems to be shared by the Greek 
Ministry of Defence which has embarked in a long-term plan aiming at making the 
Greek armed forces strongly capital intensive by adopting the modern but expensive 
dogma which places emphasis on effectiveness through speed, flexibility and 
sophisticated equipment (Greek Ministry of Defence, 2000). 
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3.4.2 Offensive Alliance Tactics: Greece and Cyprus Escalate while Turkey 
Reduces (Scenario 2) 
This scenario assumes offensive tactics on the part of the alliance, this driving the 
relative security factor RSCG to considerably higher levels compared to the arms race 
scenario previously analysed, particularly if emphasis is placed on property resources, 
while the average optimal GDP share of defence expenditure barely exceeds 3.5% for 
both allies. It is most interesting to observe with reference to the policy considerations, 
as these are derived on the basis of the “reference” strategy, that the optimal values 
derived for both the relative security factor and the GDP shares of defence expenditure 
for the two allies are identical to those derived according to the fourth scenario of 
mutual disarmament by both the allies and Turkey which we shall consider below. This 
means that the reduction of defence expenditure by the Turkish side is the decisive 
element that affects the decision of the allied side concerning its military spending and, 
consequently, the performance of the model in terms of optimal values. On the contrary, 
the extent to which the Allies will move to disarmament policies or not plays no role 
whatsoever.  
In cases of offensive tactics from the part of the alliance while, in parallel Turkey 
reduces its defence expenditure, the average optimal deviations from their 
corresponding actual for Greece are all of the order between 26% and 28%, indicating 
no substantial difference between strategies in the case of Greece while the 
corresponding Cypriot figures range between 12% and 17%. Turning, finally, to the 
relative security measure, and given the reducing policy of the Turkish side, the optimal 
relative security measure when preponderance is awarded to property resources is 
considerably close to the actual level attained by the alliance, a result more or less 
expected as shifting to capital rather than human resources seems to be part of the 
modern warfare strategy in view of the considerable decline in the Greek population 
rate, a feature of a large number of modern advanced economies. Attaining this specific 
target by placing emphasis on property resources is facilitated by the concurrent 
defence-reducing policy from the part of Turkey. 
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3.4.3 Defensive Alliance Tactics: Greece and Cyprus Reduce while Turkey 
Escalates (Scenario 3) 
As expected, the relative security factor is lower in this case compared to the 
scenario previously analysed, as a result of the defence expenditure reduction from the 
part of the alliance in parallel to the offensive Turkish tactics. The average GDP shares 
of defence expenditure, which are suggested as optimal, however, are remarkably fixed 
at about 3.5% for both allies, with maximum figures not exceeding 6.5% for Greece and 
about 6.0% for Cyprus. This simply means that as long as Turkey follows offensive 
defence policies, the two allies do not have any room for defence expenditures 
reduction. It seems, indeed, that the mobilisation of both categories of resources still 
does not seem to contribute to better defence performance, meaning that the economies 
are already close to their optimal defence expenditure levels. 
The outstanding role of Turkey in its arms race against Greece and Cyprus is 
indicated very clearly in the context of this scenario, as it has been the case in scenario 
2. To show this, one needs to resort once more to the “reference” strategy that reflects 
reality clearer than any of the others, since it is relieved of any form of emphasis on 
either resource category. We can thus observe that the optimal values suggested for the 
GDP shares of defence expenditure of both allies, as well as for the relative security 
factor RSCG are identical to those derived in the case of the first scenario, according to 
which both sides escalate. It is evident, therefore, once again that the role of Turkey in 
the arms race against Greece and Cyprus is to dictate the intensity of this race, leaving 
the opposite side no room to mitigate this influence. 
Concerning deviations between actual and optimal values, the escalation of the 
Turkish defence activity accompanied by reducing tactics from the part of the alliance 
seems to lead to attaining optimal Greek defence expenditure figures which are inferior 
to the corresponding actual by about 23% to 27% on the average. The lowest deviation 
is observed in cases in which no particular emphasis is placed on either human or 
property resources, an outcome that seems natural considering the context of this 
scenario.  The corresponding Cypriot figures, however, appear quite low, lower than 
10% in certain cases, indicating that the GDP defence expenditure is possibly close to 
what the economy can take. As a result of the policy followed by the two allies, the 
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superiority of the use of property resources is obvious in this case as well, in which the 
optimal value attained falls short with respect to the actual RSCG by only 23% against 
40% to 50% of the remaining strategies tested.  
 
3.4.4 Mutual Disarmament Agreement: Both Sides Reduce (Scenario 4) 
No matter how unrealistic this scenario appears, one must consider it for the sake of 
a complete analysis. It seems natural that diverting resources away from defence 
expenditure to alternative, non-defence activities reduces the optimal values suggested 
by the algorithm for certain observations, even if the average optimal GDP shares of 
defence expenditure remain close to 3.5% for both allies. In fact, this is the only 
scenario examined thus far in which placing emphasis on both property and human 
resources allows the Greek economy to restrict the maximum annual defence burdento 
5.5% instead of 6.5% which has been the case thus far. This should be regarded as a 
blessing given the absence of a Turkish threat, since it suggests that the economy is 
allowed to pursue its defence programme, with fewer resources devoted to it, asis stated 
by assumption. This, of course, allows for a considerable peace dividend for the Greek 
economy. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case for Cyprus which, even in 
this case,is compelled to devote to defence spending shares as high as 6.0% of its 
GDP
19
. It is finally comforting to observe that, in an environment of mutual 
disarmament policies on the part of Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey on the 
other, the relative security factor between the two allies can reach rather high values on 
certain occasions, particularly if property resources are mobilised.   
From the point of view of deviations between actual and optimal values, the mutual 
reduction scenario appears to be the least costly, for the Greek side at least, when 
emphasis is placed on human resources, in the case of which the optimal value of the 
GDP share of defence expenditure is some 22% lower than the corresponding actual. 
This being the least demanding scenario, since it involves mutual disarmament policies 
from both the allies and Turkey, does not require expensive, property-resource tactics to 
                                                          
19
 In the case of Cyprus, such peak optimal values are influenced by the only major revision of the defence 
procurement programme during the period under consideration which involved the purchase of a 
considerable number of Exocet and Aspide missiles as well as that of a large number of G3 rifles to 
replace the National Guard weapons, sometime during 1992. 
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face an arms race. It is considered, therefore, reasonable that it points towards human 
resources as the least costly solution. Cyprus, on the other hand, seems to be indifferent 
in this case, between shifting to property or human resources, with the corresponding 
average deviations being of the order of about 11%. Despite this “preference” towards 
human resources in the context of a mutual disarmament scenario, it appears that the 
relative security is best attained when emphasis is given to property resources, an 
expensive but efficient and competitive strategy. 
 
3.4.5 A Variable-Weight Scheme 
The optimal control algorithm we have used allows for the option of expressing the 
emphasis placed on certain variables not only by means of a specific target value 
selection but, in addition, by increasing the weight assigned to the deviation of the 
variable requiring emphasis from its target value. We have thus decided to try this 
alternative by assigning a double weight to the variables representing the Greek and 
Cypriot population in order to indicate our emphasis on human resources. 
Preponderance of property resources, on the other hand, is demonstrated by a double 
weight on the GDP variable of the two allies.  
It is interesting to see that the optimal values for the GDP share of the Greek and 
Cypriot defence expenditure are somewhat higher compared to those obtained by 
expressing emphasis via target selection, without, however, reaching the actual defence 
expenditure figures attained on certain occasions in the past. It is important to point out, 
therefore, that the picture concerning optimal defence expenditure remains broadly the 
same in this experiment as well, despite the fact that the optimal values obtained on the 
basis of the variable-weighting scheme are less restrictive compared to those under the 
fixed-weighting scheme. One may thus simply argue that according to the variable-
weighting scheme the peace dividend approximated by the differences between the 
optimal and the actual defence expenditure figures for the two allies appears to be 
somewhat less costly. It is much more important to point out that in both the fixed and 
the variable weighting schemes the major problem for the two allies, as this is revealed 
through the “reference” strategy, is the leading role of Turkey in this arms race. This 
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role is always underlined since the intentions of Turkey to escalate or reduce its defence 
expenditure seem to dictate the corresponding moves to Greece and Cyprus in all cases.  
The results of the constrained optimization procedure for the fixed and the variable-
weighting schemes are listed in Table 5 for Greece and Table 6 for Cyprus. 
 
 
Table 5: Constrained optimization results: optimal defence expenditure / GDP for Greece 
(extreme values and mean) 
SCENARIOS 
STRATEGIES 
HUMAN RES. PROPERTY RES. REFERENCE
* 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
ALL 
ESCALATE 
2.2 – 6.3 
3.5 
3.8 – 4.9 
4.3 
1.4 – 5.9 
3.3 
3.4 – 4.8 
4.3 
1.9 – 6.5 
3.6 
3.8 – 5.2 
4.5 
GR & CY 
ESCALATE 
TR REDUCES 
1.4 – 5.8 
3.4 
3.6 – 4.7 
4.2 
1.5 – 6.3 
3.4 
3.9 – 4.7 
4.2 
1.5 – 6.1 
3.4 
3.4 – 4.7 
4.1 
GR & CY 
REDUCE, TR 
ESCALATES 
1.8 – 5.7 
3.4 
3.4 – 5.0 
4.2 
1.6 – 6.1 
3.5 
3.7 – 4.6 
4.3 
1.9 – 6.5 
3.6 
3.8 – 5.2 
4.5 
ALL REDUCE 
2.3 – 6.4 
3.4 
3.9 – 4.8 
4.2 
1.6 – 6.1 
3.4 
3.6 – 4.8 
4.7 
1.5 – 6.1 
3.4 
3.4 – 4.7 
4.1 
* The Reference strategy is characterized by complete absence of any form of emphasis on either 
of the two resource categories. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented above leads to the following interesting conclusions: 
i. Both the Greek and the Cypriot economies are compelled to devote a substantial 
percentage of their GDP to defence expenditure, about twice as high as the 
corresponding GDP share in most EU or NATO countries, in the context of all 
scenarios and strategies tested. This is a burdensome policy option for the two 
allies given that their economies can only allow about half or, at most, two thirds 
their actual spending as the optimisation algorithm indicates. Their actual 
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defence expenditure figures, therefore, can be considered as reflecting their 
preferred positions taking into consideration, in addition to the budget constraint, 
geopolitical and strategic ones that do not enter our constraints structure. One 
may, thus, argue that this excessive expenditure measures the costs suffered by 
the alliance members due to the Greek - Turkish arms race and can be taken to 
approximate the peace dividend involved. An immediate consequence of 
excessive defence expenditure is that the relative security coefficient describing 
the alliance security status versus Turkey is much higher compared to its optimal 
values.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Constrained optimization results: Optimal defence expenditure / GDP for Cyprus 
(extreme values and mean) 
SCENARIOS 
STRATEGIES 
HUMAN RES. PROPERTY RES. REFERENCE
* 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
Fixed 
Weight 
Variable  
Weight 
ALL 
ESCALATE 
1.8 – 5.7 
3.6 
3.5 – 4.3 
4.0 
2.1 – 5.8 
3.6 
3.5 – 4.6 
4.3 
1.8 – 6.1 
3.6 
3.5 – 5.0 
4.1 
GR & CY 
ESCALATE 
TR REDUCES 
1.1 – 5.4 
3.6 
3.3 – 4.2 
3.8 
1.7 – 5.8 
3.6 
4.0 – 4.5 
4.2 
1.4 – 5.6 
3.5 
3.1 – 4.5 
3.8 
GR & CY 
REDUCE, TR 
ESCALATES 
1.6 – 6.1 
3.8 
3.1 – 4.5 
3.5 
2.1 – 5.5 
3.7 
3.8 – 4.5 
4.1 
1.8 – 6.1 
3.6 
3.5 – 5.0 
4.1 
ALL REDUCE 
1.5 – 5.9 
3.6 
3.6 – 4.3 
4.0 
1.7 – 5.8 
3.6 
3.7 – 4.6 
4.0 
1.4 – 5.6 
3.5 
3.1 – 4.5 
3.8 
* The Reference strategy is characterized by complete absence of any form of emphasis on 
either of the two resource categories. 
 
 
 
ii. The optimal values proposed by the algorithm are exclusively determined by the 
policy followed by Turkey, irrespective of the reaction on the part of Greece and 
Cyprus. This is a finding that confirms the leading role of Turkey in this arms 
race and supports the conclusions of earlier work on this issue pointing out that 
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Turkey possesses a weapon of momentous importance in its conflict against 
Greece and Cyprus, namely that of financial warfare which may lead the 
economies of its adversaries to their limits. 
iii. Placing emphasis on capital resources seems to yield optimal values, which are 
closer to the actual ones. This finding leads to the conclusion that preponderance 
of property resources over human resources, a feature of modern warfare 
philosophy, may be justified given that it yields optimal values which are, in 
most cases, closer to those actually attained, indicating an expensive, however 
desirable policy, to the extent that the high actual GDP shares of defence 
expenditure are considered necessary.      
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